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A. THE SURVIVABILITY PROBLEM
Maintaining combat effectiveness during sustained combat operations leaves little tolerance
for operational losses, particularly for carrier-based operations. This mandates that modern aircraft
be designed to survive in combat. Incorporation of survivability enhancement features results in
the probability of survival (P
s) asymptotically approaching unity as more features are added.
These survivability features and improvements, however, can be costly. Theoretically, an infinite
pot of money could purchase total survivability. However, in order to achieve and maintain
numerical superiority with a "reasonable number of acceptably survivable aircraft," a level of
"optimum survivability" must be found. This optimal level will provide the most cost-effective
mix of quantity (platforms fielded) and quality (incorporation of survivability enhancement
features).
The probability of survival is the complement of the probability of kill, Pk . In simple
probability terms, P
s
= 1- PK . Many events must occur sequentially for an aircraft to be killed by a
threat weapon system in a one-on-one encounter. Considering a guided missile threat, the system
must be activated, it must detect the aircraft, it must track the aircraft, it must launch a missile, the
missile must fly a proper intercept, and the missile must hit the aircraft or a proximity-fuzed high
explosive warhead must be detonated. Finally, the damage caused by the hit or detonation must be
sufficient to kill the aircraft. Each link in this chain of events must occur for the aircraft to be
killed. An encounter tree diagram that represents this chain of events, is shown in Figure 1-1,
where each event or branch is represented by a probability. In summary,
"kill ~~ V* Activated-* V ~DetectMctivated-'^Track/Detect>'V* Uunch/TrackA
Degrading any of the right side branches (probabilities) in the tree results in the aircraft surviving
the engagement with a higher probability.
B. DEFINITIONS
The Department of Defense published MIL-STD-2089 in July 1 98 1 for the purpose of
standardizing the definitions of survivability related terms. In accordance with that document, the
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Figure 1-1: Encounter Tree Diagram (after Ball, 1997)
1. Survivability
MIL-STD-2089 defines survivability as "the capability of an aircraft to avoid or withstand a
man-made hostile environment without sustaining an impairment of its ability to accomplish its
designated mission." In terms of the tree diagram above, the goal of a survivability engineer is to
degrade the probabilities associated with the right hand branches in the tree diagram. When
evaluated from the perspective of aircrew anxiety, degrading early branches is better than
degrading later branches—defeating missiles on the rail is always preferable to being hit but not
killed.
2. Susceptibility
Susceptibility is defined as "the degree to which a device, equipment, or weapons system is
open to effective attack due to one or more inherent weaknesses." The susceptibility branch of the
survivability discipline searches for ways to prevent the aircraft from being hit. Susceptibility
reductions involve the incorporation of features or techniques that degrade early branches, up to
and including the aircraft being hit. These features fall into six general categories: threat warning,

jamming and deceiving, signature reduction, expendables, threat suppression, and tactics (Ball,
1985).
3. Vulnerability
Vulnerability is defined as "the characteristics of a system which cause it to suffer a
definite degradation (incapability to perform the designated mission) as a result of having been
subjected to a certain level of effects in an unnatural (manmade) hostile environment." The
vulnerability branch of the survivability discipline attempts to "harden" the aircraft to prevent a kill,
given that the aircraft is hit. Vulnerability reduction techniques also fall into six general categories:
component redundancy with separation, component location, passive damage suppression, active
damage suppression, component shielding, and component elimination (Ball, 1985).
C. THE EFFECT OF SIGNATURES AND ONBOARD ELECTRONIC
ATTACK (EA) CAPABILITIES ON SUSCEPTIBILITY
Susceptibility, as defined above, involves the first six branches in the encounter tree
diagram. Of the six susceptibility reduction concepts, signature reduction stands alone as the one
concept that is absolutely best when designed into the aircraft from the beginning. Threat warning
systems, countermeasures systems, expendables systems, threat suppression, and tactics can all be
developed and added after the aircraft is produced, although at some cost. Airframe modifications
to reduce signatures, however, tend to be very expensive and only moderately effective when
added later. Thus, the aircraft signature is a significant concern during the early design phase.
Where does one look for guidance on how small the signature must be? If the signature
requirement is set at a very small level, the aircraft runs the risk of being too expensive to purchase
in large quantities. If the signature level is permitted to be too large, the aircraft risks experiencing
unacceptable attrition levels, which would ultimately result in limiting the mission effectiveness of
the aircraft.
When dealing with radar SAMs, the most important signature to reduce is the radar
signature, or radar cross section (RCS) of the aircraft. (For the remainder of this thesis, "reduction
of RCS" and "signature reduction" will be used interchangeably.) The aircraft RCS is a factor
early in the encounter tree diagram. It primarily affects the threat system's ability to detect the
aircraft as the aircraft flies on its mission. Reducing the RCS reduces the range at which the
aircraft can be detected, given that the threat is active. ("Given that the threat is active"
acknowledges that early warning radars, which typically operate at lower frequencies and are less
affected by RCS reductions, may have detected the aircraft and alerted the threat sites, making them
active.)
Jamming and deceiving are susceptibility reduction concepts designed to prevent the threat
radar from initially detecting the aircraft radar return or from being able to accurately track the
aircraft once detection occurs. Once detected and tracked, the ability of the threat system to guide a
missile to a successful intercept can be degraded by employing noise jamming and deceiving.
Thus, if it is too expensive to reduce the RCS to levels that result in the desired survivability for the
specified missions, the incorporation of onboard EA techniques and equipment, in conjunction
with a moderate reduction in RCS, can provide a cost effective method of achieving the desired
survivability.
D. THE BOTTOM LINE-HOW SMALL SHOULD THE RCS BE, AND HOW
MUCH ONBOARD EA EQUIPMENT POWER DO WE NEED?
The answer to this question is driven by the mission-threat analysis. This analysis of how
the aircraft is expected to be utilized, against an estimate of the projected threat, will form the basis
of determining what sort of tactical advantage must be provided. Tactical advantage is the ability to
get the first lethal shot off in any engagement. It is achieved by providing survivability
enhancement features, e.g., low RCS level and powerful EA equipment (a jammer), such that the
aircraft can close to a range that will allow the first lethal shot, without being killed. This thesis
assumes that it is desirable to achieve as much of that tactical advantage as possible (affordable)
with reduction in the aircraft RCS.
Any reduction in RCS results in a reduced detection range with corresponding reduction in
the jammer power required to prevent detection or to deceive the threat. It also may allow the
employment of better jamming techniques that may be more effective against the projected threat.
These techniques may require greater jammer power for effectiveness. How much EA is needed
will depend on how much of the required tactical advantage was not achieved through RCS
reduction.
Associated with both RCS reduction and EA equipment power are costs. Of great interest
is the combination of RCS level and EA power that results in minimum cost for a given level of
survivability. Since missions the aircraft must perform drive aircraft requirements, a set of typical
missions must be selected. For the purpose of this report, missions of a generic Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF) were chosen. To answer the question "what combination of RCS level and EA
capabilities results in a minimum cost for a given level of survivability?," this report develops a
robust methodology that can be used to evaluate what combinations of RCS level and EA power
provide the survivability required of the JSF in those mission areas. The costs of these
combinations are to be determined in other studies.

II. THE GENERIC JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER (JSF) AND ITS MISSIONS
A. JSF DESCRIPTION
The generic joint strike fighter is a multi-role aircraft capable of performing both strike and
fighter type missions. It is capable of filling the mission roles of the AV-8B Harrier, the A- 10
Thunderbolt II, the F-14 Tomcat, the F-16 Falcon, and the F/A-18 Hornet. As such, it must
provide air superiority as well as achieve self-escort strike capability. To be affordable, it must be
an efficient compromise between fighter attributes and strike attributes. It must have adequate
range capability to enable it to carry the fight to the enemy, it must have sufficient payload to inflict
precise damage upon arrival, and it must be survivable.
B. JSF MISSIONS
The JSF can be expected to perform in the general mission areas of a strike fighter, which
include both strike and air-to-air missions. These general strike fighter mission areas can be
broken down into many specific missions. A brief, unclassified description of several specific
missions are described below.
1. Combat Air Patrol (CAP)
The CAP mission consists of providing air superiority in a specific area. Its many
variations include target area CAP (TARCAP), barrier CAP (BARCAP), and MIGCAP. These
missions typically involve precise navigation to deconflict sectors, the penetration of enemy air
defenses if required, as well as the influencing, countering, targeting, and destruction of airborne
threats if necessary.
2. Fighter Escort (FE)
The Fighter Escort mission consists of providing air superiority for strike missions. The
purpose of this mission is to prevent enemy fighters from interfering with a strike package during
the transit to the target. It involves precise navigation to maintain position relative to the strike
package; the penetration of enemy air defenses; as well as the influencing, countering, targeting
and destruction of airborne threats if required.
3. Deck Launched Interceptor (DLI)
The DLI mission consists of a rapid transition from a cold start to maximum energy
addition in order to intercept enemy airborne threats as far away from base as possible. Typically
scrambled from an alert posture, this mission involves long range detection, acquisition, targeting,
and missile employment against threat aircraft and missiles.
4. Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)
The SEAD mission consists of negating enemy air defenses or the integrated air defense
system (IADS). In its most common application, this means committing anti-radiation missiles
(ARMs) against threat SAM systems. It involves precise navigation and timing to coordinate the
attack, penetration of enemy air defenses if required, and the acquisition, tracking, and targeting of
ground based emitters. The weapon of choice for SEAD missions is the High speed Anti-
Radiation Missile (HARM). SEAD can range in scope from being the overall mission objective
(e.g. sequential threat roll back) to being a support mission during a coordinated strike.
5. Interdiction
The Interdiction mission consists of attacking ground targets beyond the Forward Edge of
the Battle Area (FEBA). The purpose of this type mission is to prevent the enemy from conducting
operations in a specific area or to reduce the enemy's ability to wage war through the destruction of
high value targets. It involves the penetration of enemy air defenses, precise navigation to avoid
threat concentrations, countering of airborne threats if required, and the acquisition, targeting,
and/or tracking of ground targets.
A variant of interdiction is the "surgical strike," a one-time mission with clearly defined
goals achievable on a single attack. This type strike is not part of a sustained campaign, but is
designed to capitalize on the element of surprise associated with a one-time event. As such, it must
be prepared to confront the enemy IADS in its fully operational condition. Therefore, it does not
have the luxury of prolonged SEAD support to roll back the threat before committing a strike
package.
6. War-at-Sea (WAS)
The WAS mission consists of attacking sea-based targets. The target in this case is highly
mobile and collocated with numerous SAM threats. It involves tight coordination with other assets
(particularly SEAD), penetration of enemy air defenses, and the acquisition, targeting, and tracking
of enemy ships.
7. Close Air Support (CAS)
The CAS mission consists of attacking ground targets in support of friendly ground troops
at, or near, the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). The close proximity to friendly troops
makes the CAS mission very demanding. It involves extremely precise navigation and timing to
prevent inadvertently endangering friendly troops, the penetration of enemy air defenses, and the
acquisition, targeting, and/or tracking of ground targets.
C. MISSION THREAT ANALYSIS
1. Air-to-Air Missions
Current aircraft that could be a threat to the JSF, such as the Mig-29 Fulcrum, possess
significantly improved air-to-air missiles with increased range capabilities. The estimated range of
the AA-10 Alamo is 50 - 1 10 km and the AIM- 120 AMRAAM is 50 km (Jane's All the World's
Aircraft, 1996). Thus, U.S. Forces currently lack a modern missile with an equivalent range and
are at a distinct tactical disadvantage in terms of a long range missile capability. This results in
threat aircraft possessing the capability to achieve first launch or simultaneous launch against U.S.
aircraft at long ranges, as shown in Figure II- 1.
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: Beyond Visual Range (BVR) Air-to-Air Engagement - JSF Tactically Disadvantaged
One way to regain the tactical advantage is to decrease the launch range of the AA-10
through the use ofRCS reduction and EA capabilities. An acceptable tactical advantage in air-to-air
missions would be realized if the JSF possessed RCS reduction and EA capabilities such that it
could prosecute an intercept to arrive within 18-20 nm, or approximately 35 km, of the threat
aircraft, while denying the threat aircraft the opportunity to "target" the JSF, where targeting is
defined as detecting the JSF and generating and maintaining a track file suitable for weapons







Figure II- 2 : BVR Air-to-Air Engagement - JSF With Tactical Advantage
This scenario assumes the JSF has the capability to utilize Low Probability of Intercept
(LPI) radar modes for targeting and sorting, i.e., modes that will not trigger a radar warning
receivers (RWR) on the threat aircraft. Another requirement is that the JSF can commit missiles
from LPI track files or a Link- 16 track file.
10

Thus, the goal for the air-to-air mission is to determine those combinations of RCS level
and EA power that allow the JSF to close within 35 km of a representative threat aircraft without
being targeted. This acknowledges that the JSF may be detected, but the threat aircraft is unable to
generate and maintain a track file suitable for weapons launch. For the purpose of analysis, the
Mig-29 Fulcrum with Slotback radar has been chosen as the representative threat aircraft.
2. Strike Missions
Current threat SAM systems have a significant range advantage over attacking aircraft
employing conventional weapons. Furthermore, SAM systems are frequently collocated with high
value targets, forcing the attacking aircraft to directly penetrate the enemy SAM rings. This leaves








Figure II-3: Tactically Disadvantaged JSF Strike Aircraft
Current tactics and weapon acquisition programs attempt to reduce this disadvantage by
emphasizing standoff. The Joint Stand Off Weapon (JSOW), the Joint Direct Attack Munition
(JDAM), and the Standoff Land Attack Missile (SLAM) are examples of this approach, the least
expensive being JDAM. In spite of this, current strike aircraft are still at a tactical disadvantage
against most threat SAM systems. An acceptable tactical advantage on strike missions would be
realized if the JSF could close to within JDAM range (assumed for the purposes of this report to be
6 nm, or approximately 1 1 km) of a SAM without being tracked accurately enough to be targeted










JS F Strike Aircraft
Figure II-4: JSF Strike Aircraft with Tactical Advantage
In addition, SEAD missions would benefit greatly from the ability to attack the enemy
IADS from shorter range. SEAD aircraft would then be capable of achieving a "hard kill" on a
SAM with an inexpensive JDAM rather than an expensive HARM. In addition, bomb damage
assessment (BDA) would be much easier. Thus, the goal for strike and SEAD missions is to
determine those combinations of RCS level and EA power that allow the JSF to close to within 1
1
km of a representative SAM site without being tracked accurately enough for the SAM to commit a
missile. The SA-2E with the Fansong radar has been chosen as a representative SAM system for
the purpose of this analysis due to the availability of unclassified data. The SA-6 would be a better
choice as a more modern threat, however, required radar data does not exist at the unclassified
level.
If the desired tactical advantage is unachievable using JDAM, an alternate mission threat
analysis could be performed using the greater standoff capabilities (and greater cost) of JSOW.
Ultimately, it is up to the warfighters to determine mission requirements with which to conduct
mission threat analyses.
3. Jammer Employment
The onboardjammer is used to degrade detection, tracking and guidance. Employed
incorrectly, EA can become a beacon, highlighting the aircraft when it would otherwise not have
been detected. To be effective, it is vital that the jammer employ coherent, smart techniques, and
not function as a beacon, which can be the case with noisejamming, and that tactics be developed
12

regarding when to radiate during operational scenarios. For the purpose of this report, it is
assumed that appropriate tactics are developed governing the operational use of EA.
13
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III. SIGNATURE REDUCTION AND SUSCEPTIBILITY REDUCTION
CONCEPTS AND EQUATIONS
A. AIRCRAFT RADAR CROSS SECTION (RCS)
Radars "detect" objects actively by transmitting an electromagnetic wave in a pulse form
and "listening" for the return echoes (or with electronic surveillance (ES) systems passively
listening for target emissions). Radar waves, like all waves, reflect (or re-radiate) when
encountering a boundary between two media. A boundary such as that between a metal and free
space will reflect essentially all of the pulse, while a boundary between free space and a material
with an electromagnetic impedance near that of free space (377 ohms) will reflect very little. The
shaping, spacing and material of these boundaries, as well as the size of the aircraft and its
boundaries relative to the radar wavelength, determine how the wave is reflected. Of interest is the
magnitude of the reflected pulse in the direction of the receiving antenna, known as the radar echo
or signal. The magnitude of the echo is directly proportional to the aircraft RCS.
1. RCS Shape (Magnitude and Azimuth)
Different shapes reflect waves differently. In descending order, the strongest magnitude
reflections come from trihedral corners, dihedral corners, flat plates, cylinders, spheres, straight
edges normal to the incident wave, curved edges normal to the wave, cones and ogives (Kopp,
1996). The RCS of an aircraft is actually the result of the vector/phase sum of the reflections, or
echoes, from all the scattering surfaces the incident wave encounters. As such, the RCS changes
dramatically with azimuth and the frequency of the incident wave. The result is a starburst pattern,
shown in Figure HI- 1 , that dramatically illustrates the scintillation produced by small changes in
azimuth.
The RCS presented in Figure IH-1 is much too complex for efficient modeling, therefore,
several simplifications are made to make it easier to analyze. The most basic simplification is to
represent the RCS with a circle of constant amplitude, known as a "fuzzball."
15
Figure III-l: Typical Aircraft RCS (after Skolnik)
2. How RCS is Reduced
A large part of reducing an aircraft's RCS involves carefully managing the shape of all
possible boundaries. Furthermore, the inclusion of special lossy coatings closely matching the
dielectric constant of free space help to absorb incident energy rather than reflect it. Obviously, the
most effective way to reduce the RCS of an aircraft is to provide structural input early in the design
phase. Unfortunately, the addition of coatings to a mature design is often likely to provide only
moderate reductions at a high weight and cost penalty.
Signature reduction is most effective in typical combat situations when applied to the
forward quarter of an aircraft (±60 ° of the nose). This is due to the fact that prosecuting a forward
quarter attack provides the threat system with favorable Doppler as well as increasing signal
strength as the aircraft closes on the threat emitter. The beams and rear quarter are less critical due
to the reduced Doppler in the beams and a combination of missile kinematics and the weakening
signal strength of an opening target in the rear. The simplified RCS of an aircraft with this type of
signature often resembles a "pacman," as seen in Figure III-2.
Figure III-2: Simplified RCS with Forward Quarter Reductions
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To achieve true stealth, an aircraft must have a reduced RCS when viewed from any
direction. However, an aircraft must have some edges, corners, and joints, making it very difficult
to significantly reduce the RCS from all aspects. Therefore, edges, corners, and joints are all
aligned to focus the RCS in two axes, comprising 4 directions or "lobes." The resulting "X"
shaped RCS is shown in Figure III-3.
Figure HI-3: RCS with All Aspect Reductions
B. RADAR DETECTION AND THE EFFECT OF SIGNATURE REDUCTION
Signature reduction has a dramatic affect on survivability. Reducing the RCS of the aircraft
reduces the probability of detection, tracking, and missile launch at any given range. This leads to
a reduction in the aircraft's exposure to the threat by reducing the time spent in a threat envelope.
All of these effects serve to increase the P
s
of the aircraft.
A study of how RCS reduction affects survivability must begin with a discussion of how
radar works. Monostatic radar determines the location of objects by transmitting electromagnetic
pulses from an antenna, and then "listening" for the echo with the same (collocated) antenna. If the
pulse is transmitted from an isotropic antenna (one which transmits uniformly in all directions), the
power density in the pulse a distance R from the radar is calculated using eq. (HI-l),
P r




is the radar transmitter power in watts, and R is distance from the radar in meters. The
4kR2 in the denominator accounts for the decrease in signal strength as the power is spread
spherically, and is termed the "spreading loss." Radars employ directive antennas, which serve to
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focus the power in a specific direction. The measure of how well the antenna functions in this
capacity is termed the antenna gain, defined as the power density spread in the desired direction
divided by the power density that would have been radiated by an isotropic antenna. To account
for this gain, eq. (EQ-1) is multiplied by the radar antenna's transmitter gain, G
t
. Incidentally, the
radar power times the antenna gain is termed the effective radiated power (ERP).
If the transmitted power density impinges on an aircraft or other target, some of the power
is reflected toward the radar receiver. The amount of power reflected is a direct function of the
RCS, denoted o, and is highly dependent on aspect angle, frequency, and aircraft scattering
surfaces. RCS is defined as "the fictional area intercepting that amount of power, which, when
scattered equally in all directions, produces an echo at the radar equal to that from the target"
(Skolnick, 1980). The echo also suffers from spreading loss on the return path to the radar, where
it is detected based on the effective area of the antenna, A
e
. The resulting equation for echo power,
S, is provided as Eq. (III-2).
Power received = S = l I x =- x AP (HI - 2)
4nR 2 4ttR 2
Eq. (1H-3) is the relationship between the effective area of an antenna A
e






where X is the wavelength in meters. For the monostatic radar, which receives and transmits using
the same antenna, substituting A, given by eq. (III-3), into eq. (HI-2) results in eq. (III-4),
S = / *3 4 (m-4)
(47t)
jR
which shows the direct relationship between the received echo signal power and the RCS. Figure






Figure IH-4: Typical Radar Transmission Path
The maximum range at which detection by threat radar occurs (excluding noise and losses)
can be computed by solving for R in eq. (UI-4). The result is eq. (ITI-5), where S^ represents the














The noise power present in the receiver bandwidth must be taken into account, as well as
system losses such as plumbing, scanning, beam-shaping, collapsing, limiting, field degradation,
etc., when estimating detection ranges. Losses are typically lumped together and included as the
term L in the denominator. This loss factor is evaluated for each type radar system and can be used
to evaluate design efficiency. The noise power present in the frequency band processed by the













where k is Boltzmann's constant (1.38 x 10'23 J/°K), T
s
is the equivalent noise temperature of the
entire system, and B
r
is the noise bandwidth of the receiver. The equivalent noise temperature of
the system can be broken down into the antenna noise temperature, T
a
and the equipment noise
temperature, T
e
. The noise bandwidth of the receiver is approximately equal to the IF bandwidth
of the radar, which is in turn approximately equal to the reciprocal of the pulse width for an
optimum matched filter IF bandwidth.
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The antenna noise temperature, T
a
,
accounts for the noise power from all sources
"upstream" of the antenna output terminals. Sources of this noise include the sun and moon
(atmospheric noise), radome, antenna, and waveguides. Obviously, the antenna noise power
present depends largely on the noise background in the direction the beam is pointing. The
equipment noise takes into account the thermal noise produced in the receiver, and is commonly







is the receiver noise figure, and T is the ambient noise temperature (290°K). The
receiver noise figure is a measure of how much the input signal-to-noise ratio is degraded and is
commonly equated to the ratio of the noise output of the actual receiver compared to the noise
output of an ideal receiver. It is often assumed that T
a
= T , in which case the noise power present
in the receiver is calculated using eq. (III-8).






The minimum received signal power that results in detection depends on many things. In
order for a signal to be detected, it must exceed a preset threshold relative to the random
background noise. The amplitude of the background noise at any instant in time will vary in a
Gaussian manner. This distributed noise will have an average amplitude about which the









Figure III-5: Signal to Noise Threshold
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The radar designer sets a threshold to limit the number of noise spikes above that threshold to a
predetermined rate, called the false alarm rate. The setting of this threshold involves a trade off
between an acceptable false alarm rate and the desired probability of detection. Increasing the
threshold decreases both the false alarm rate and the probability of detection, and vice versa. It has
been experimentally shown that reasonable false alarm rates and probabilities of detection for
radars utilizing automatic detection logic result in required signal-to-noise, (S/N) det , ratios of 10-25
(10-14 dB). For operator-in-the-loop systems, the required signal-to-noise ratio drops to 6-10 (8-
10 dB), depending on operator proficiency (Levien, 1997).
The effect of noise and the threshold signal-to-noise ratio on the ability of the radar to
process a signal is accounted for by multiplying and dividing S min by the noise power, given by eq.
(IH-8). The result is eq. (ffl-9),
Snun=kT BrFn(%)det (m-9)
where S/N
de( is the minimum signal-to-noise ratio required by the threat radar to detect a target
against the noise background. Substituting S
min given by eq. (III-9) into eq. (III-5) and including






Decreasing any of the terms in the numerator or increasing any of the terms in the denominator will
reduce the maximum detection range. The only factor aircraft designers have control over is
obviously the RCS of the platform. Thus, reducing RCS is the major way designers try to reduce
susceptibility to radar guided threats.
Equation (EI- 10) applies only to a single pulse from a radar that has echo power S given by
eq. (HI-4). As a radar scans across a target, it receives a return echo on each successive pulse. By
integrating the signal power from all these echo pulses, the receiver adds the signals linearly to get
a much stronger resultant signal. The noise, on the other hand, does not add linearly. As
discussed earlier, noise varies randomly in amplitude. It also varies randomly in phase. Thus,
unlike the coherent radar signal, the incoherent noise adds vectorially as seen in Figure III-6.
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Figure III-6: Noise Added Vectorially
Perfect integration, also called predetection integration, adds up all the return echoes to get





where N is the number of pulses per scan, is the antenna beamwidth in degrees, F
p
is the pulse
repetition frequency, or PRF, in pulses per second, and co is the antenna scan rate in degrees per
second. Unfortunately, a perfect integrator is difficult to implement and seldom used. Analysis of
data presented by Skolnik demonstrates a simple relationship between the integration improvement
factor, I(N), and the number of pulses on a target, N. This relationship is presented in eq. (Ill- 12)
and holds for postdetection integration, which is easier to accomplish and more commonly used.
0.8






This integration improvement factor measures the magnitude of the power S, given by the right










where S/Ndet still represents the minimum signal-to-noise ratio required by the threat radar to detect
a target against the noise background.
Given that reducing RCS is to be used to reduce susceptibility, how much should the RCS
be reduced to avoid detection until a given range? The RCS required to avoid detection until a
given range, R^, is solved for by rearranging the preceding equation, which yields eq. (HI- 14).
Rjiax (47C)3LkT B rFn (S/^)detG =
0.8
2i2P
t Gf 7c 6Fp;
(in
-14)
Data from unclassified sources are not typically available for all the parameters in eqs. (IH-
13 and 14). Specifically, antenna gain is rarely presented in unclassified documents. To permit an
analysis using unclassified data presented, two methods of estimating antenna gain are presented.




=d2 Ti (IE -15)
where d is the antenna diameter in centimeters and r\ is the aperture efficiency (typically 70%)
(Stimson, 1983). This is extremely useful for airborne fire control radars which operate near 10
GHz. Another convenient approximation involves the beamwidth of the radar, which is often
published openly. The gain for a circular parabolic antenna can be approximated using eq. (III-
16),
^ 26,000g,-— cm- 16)
where 9 and (j) are the 3 dB beamwidth, in degrees, in the two planes of interest (Stutzman and
Thiele, 1981).
In order to use eq. (HI- 14) as a means of using unclassified data to calculate how small the
RCS must be in order to inhibit detection until a certain range, some representative values for the
other variables must be provided. Widely published unclassified data, as well as some engineering
estimates, were used to create a list of representative values, included as Table ffl-1.
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Table III-l: Typical Radar Parameters
Parameters A-A Strike








S/N det 20 10





CO (deg/sec) 80 120
6 (degrees) 2.5 1.5
n 0.7 NA





a(m 2 ) 0.31 8.66E-06
In accordance with the mission threat analysis performed previously, the aircraft is required
to avoid detection until 35 km (19 nm) for the air-to-air mission against a typical airborne threat
radar (the Mig-29 Slotback radar), and until 1 1 km (6 nm) for the Strike mission against a common
ground based radar (the SA-2E Fansong radar). Meters were chosen as the unit of length since
radar data are typically presented in those units, although nautical miles are more significant
tactically.
Using these data and eq. (Ill- 14), Figures EEI-7 and ITJ-8 were generated, which plot RCS
versus detection range for the threat radars in the air-to-air and strike scenarios, respectively, where
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Figure III-7: RCS vs. Range for Air-to-Air Radar (S/N = 20)
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Figure III-8: RCS vs. Range for Strike Radar (S/N = 10)
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C. COUNTERING SIGNATURE REDUCTION
With so much emphasis on reducing aircraft RCS, we must assume that a strong emphasis
will also be placed on countering stealth technology. Short of fielding and integrating huge
numbers of tracking radars to achieve sufficient radar density to maintain a track, one method of
countering stealth is to use radars with lower frequency and/or wider bandwidth. These have great
potential, but current authors indicate that they are incapable of providing fire control data for
weapons launch. Another recent attempt at countering stealth involved the discovery of the "radar
hole" left by such aircraft. A stealth aircraft attempts to focus whatever reflected electro-magnetic
waves it can't absorb in directions deemed to be tactically less threatening, typically 45 - 60
degrees off the nose. A byproduct of this is that the aircraft also reduces the amount of "clutter"
the radar receives in the direction of the aircraft. If the lack of radar return clutter could be tracked
effectively, it would render stealth incapable of providing the required tactical advantage. A third
possible solution to the stealth threat involves the use of bi-static radars (radars that employ
different antennas to transmit and receive) with widely separated antennas. In theory, a bi-static
radar could disperse receive antennas to take advantage of the focused radar return of stealth
aircraft to generate fire control solutions. Nevertheless, every reduction in RCS increases the
enemy's cost of admission to the next conflict.
The end result of effective solutions to the stealth problem, in any event, would be a
lessening of the effectiveness of RCS reductions and a corresponding stronger need for EA
capabilities. For the purposes of this report, stealth will be considered to be effective. A lessening
of its effectiveness could be treated as a larger RCS circle or ellipse, leading to a need for more
powerful EA capabilities.
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IV. ONBOARD ELECTRONIC ATTACK AND SUSCEPTIBILITY
REDUCTION
A. NOISE JAMMING AND DECEIVING
Electronic warfare is made up of three essential elements, Electronic Surveillance (ES),
Electronic Attack (EA), and Electronic Protection (EP). Electronic Surveillance deals with
intercepting and analyzing electromagnetic emissions in order to develop a better understanding of
enemy capabilities and to determine an appropriate response. Electronic Attack, formerly called
electronic countermeasures (ECM), encompasses all methods of denying the use of the
electromagnetic spectrum to the enemy. Electronic Protection, formerly called electronic counter-
countermeasures (ECCM), describes any action taken to prevent the enemy from denying the use
of the electromagnetic spectrum by friendly forces.
Two important tenets of EA designed to deny the enemy's use of radar (and
communications) are noise jamming and deceiving. For noise jamming and deceiving to be
effective, it has been experimentally demonstrated that the jammer power must exceed some
threshold related to the echo signal power. This threshold is typically referred to as the jamming to
signal ratio required for effectiveness, or (J/S)
req
.
d . The development of this ratio starts with the







S = 7^ff (ni-4)
The strength of the return echo suffers from a 2-way spreading loss as seen by the factor of
R4 in the denominator. The jammer power, on the other hand, only suffers from a 1-way






the jammer transmitter power and Gj is the jammer antenna gain, then the jammer power received
by the victim radar receiver, P
r/j ,
is given by eq. (IV- 1),
Pr/j = J =





Unfortunately, the polarization of the jammer is rarely the same as that of the radar.
Jammers are typically circularly (or slant) polarized in order to maintain effectiveness against both
horizontally and vertically polarized radars. (If the jammer were horizontally polarized and the
radar were vertically polarized, theoretically, none of the jammer power would get to the receiver.
In reality, approximately 1% of the jammer power gets to the receiver.) This results in the radar
"filtering out" a significant amount of the jammer power due to the polarization mismatch. To
account for this polarization loss, the "L
p
" factor is added to the denominator of eq. (IV- 1), as seen
in eq. (IV-2).
RGiGA2
J= J \ 2 (IV -2)(47tR) L
p
A typical value for L
p
is 2, representing a polarization loss of 3 dB, or half the power.
The J/S ratio can be derived by dividing the jammer power at the victim receiver (eq. IV-2)




There are numerous different jamming techniques available to the countermeasures
designer. Different techniques generally require different J/S ratios to be effective. Of interest to
the countermeasures designer is the Jammer Effective Radiated Power (JERP) required to equal the
(J/S)





J J R 2 4tc
Thus, the JERP required to effectively defeat a target radar at a specific range is a function
of the (J/S)^ for the jamming technique being implemented, the ERP of the radar being jammed,
and the RCS of the aircraft. Of prime importance when choosing which jamming techniques to
implement is an understanding of the technique, as well as the (J/S)
reqd for that technique to be
effective. A short, unclassified, description of several common EA techniques, as well as their
(J/S^.j, is presented below.
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1. Noise Jamming
Noisejamming involves the injection of "noise" into the victim radar receiver. If the noise
jamming is strong enough, it raises the average noise power in the receiver, thereby degrading the
S/(N+J) ratio in the receiver to a low enough level that the signal is obscured. The jammer power
must at least equal the signal power in the receiver in order to obscure the signal. Thejammer
power must be at least 1-4 times greater than the signal power (J/S = 0-6 dB) to be effective









Figure IV- 1 : Signal + Noise + Jamming
There are two general classifications of noise jamming based on the bandwidth ratio, Bj/B
r
.
If thejammer bandwidth is essentially equal to the receiver bandwidth (the bandwidth ratio is low)
the jamming is termed "spot" noise jamming. Thus, eq. (IV-4) holds for spot noise jamming, if
the bandwidth over which the jammer power is spread exactly equals the instantaneous bandwidth
of the radar receiver. If, on the other hand, thejammer bandwidth is significantly larger than the
receiver bandwidth (the bandwidth ratio is high), thejamming is termed "barrage" noise jamming.
Spotjamming is obviously the most efficient form of noise jamming in terms ofjammer power
required, but the advent of frequency agile radars has generally forced a transition to barrage
jamming, or frequency following jamming.
Frequency agile radars transmit over numerous frequencies within a defined operating
range. One series of pulses may be transmitted at one frequency, and the next series can be
transmitted at a frequency several hundred megahertz different from the first. In addition to
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frequency, the radar may alter the PRF and pulse width from one transmission to the next, which
changes the instantaneous bandwidth as shown in the previous chapter. The receiver processing
the radar return has the additional advantage of knowing the bandwidth of the transmitted
waveform. This bandwidth is expanded slightly by the receiver (to account for Doppler shifts) and
a band pass filter is employed to exclude all the energy (noise, jamming, and deception) that does
not occur in that bandwidth. The jammer, on the other hand, will never know for certain exactly
where on the frequency spectrum the radar may transmit next (assuming the frequency hopping
algorithm is not readily predictable), and must spread the jammer power over the entire range of
frequencies over which the radar is likely to operate. Thus, the difference in bandwidths must be
taken into account in eqs. (TV-2) and (IV-4). Eq. (IV-5) shows how the received signal is
processed over the instantaneous bandwidth of the receiver only, whereas the noise jammer power
is spread over the jammer operating bandwidth Bj.
J= -L-L4 (IV-5)
(4tcR)2 BjP
Dividing eq. (IV-5) by the return radar signal as before, and again solving for the noise jammer




Furthermore, the noise jammer power, like the noise it seeks to replicate, will not be
integrated in the receiver, whereas the signal power will benefit from the integration improvement
factor, I, given by eq. (111-8). This is taken into account in eq. (IV-7).
sL.H ptG tBJ°p reFnr
PGj -i*£f» X p (IV - 7)
Thus, the main goal of a frequency agile radar is to force the noise jammer into less
efficient barrage jamming by spreading radar transmissions over a wide frequency band. An
additional benefit is that by spreading the transmissions over a wide frequency band, the frequency
agile radar reduces the probability of detection by ES systems.
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2. Range Gate Pull Off (RGPO)
Range Gate Pull Off (RGPO) is the first of several deceptive techniques presented in this
report. Deceptive jamming differs from noise jamming in that there is typically no bandwidth
differential. Furthermore, since the jammer waveform strives to be nearly identical to the signal
waveform, it will be integrated and will suffer losses much like the signal waveform. The
integration and loss factors for the jammer waveform will not exactly equal the integration and loss
factors for the signal waveform, but will be approximated as such in this report. Therefore, the J/S
ratio will be the same for many integrated pulses as it is for a single pulse, given by eq. (IV-4).
RGPO is effective against pulsed radars utilizing automatic gain control (AGC). Pulse
radars determine target range by transmitting pulses and determining the time required for the echo
to return. The range is equal to the speed of light times the time delay divided by 2 to account for
the 2-way trip. Once the radar receives an echo, it establishes "range gates" around the time it
expects the next echo to arrive. Typically, this involves straddling the expected return time with an
early and a late gate. The jammer observes the pulse, and immediately transmits an identical cover
pulse. The strength of the cover pulse is gradually increased until it eventually forces the radar's
AGC to lower its sensitivity to the actual skin return of the aircraft. Once this occurs, the jammer
then walks the range gates off the aircraft by delaying the transmitted pulse an ever increasing
amount. The rate at which the time delay increases must be representative of typical target
maneuvers, i.e. increasing the delay at a rate corresponding to a 20-g turn might trigger a logic
loop which identifies the deception. Once the deception is sufficient, the jamming ceases and the
radar is forced to re-acquire the aircraft. The jammer power at the victim receiver must be 1-4
times greater than the signal power (J/S = 0-6 dB) for this technique to be effective (Schleher,
1986).
Another related deception technique is range gate pull in (RGPI). Due to the use of time
delayed transmissions, the RGPO technique can only deceive the radar into thinking the target is
farther away. If the radar uses an easily predictable pulse repetition interval (PRI), then the time of
arrival of the next pulse can be anticipated. If the jammer can capture the range gates and transmit a
stronger pulse ahead of the return echo, the range gates can be walked in toward the radar. A third
related option is "smart" noise jamming, in which the jammer acknowledges the unpredictable,
ever changing PRI and transmits a relatively long burst of noise timed after the preceding pulse and
of long enough duration to cover all possible PRI's of the following pulse.
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3. Velocity Gate Pull Off (VGPO)
Velocity Gate Pull Off (VGPO) is a deception technique that is effective against Continuous
wave (CW) and pulse Doppler (PD) radars. CW and PD radars use the Doppler frequency shift of
the target to set up velocity gates in much the same way pulse radars use range gates. Due to the
dynamics of an encounter between an aircraft and a threat radar, the closure rate (and Doppler
frequency shift) may change rapidly. In addition, the return signal strength can fluctuate
dramatically as the target aspect (and RCS) changes. Thus, the jammer must transmit a much
stronger signal at the same frequency as the incident radar signal to capture the velocity gate. If the
jammer and the aircraft move together (always the case with onboard jamming, but not necessarily
so with a towed transmitter while maneuvering) the return signal from the aircraft and the jammer
signal will be shifted equally. The jammer signal is then increased in frequency and walked off in
velocity. As in RGPO, the rate at which the jammer frequency is increased must be representative
of typical aircraft maneuvers. The jammer power at the victim receiver must also be 1-4 times
greater than the signal power (J/S = 0-6 dB) for this technique to be effective (Schleher, 1986).
4. Inverse Gain Scan
Inverse gain scan is a deception technique with good effectiveness against Conical scan
(Conscan) radars. Conscan radars track targets by nutating a feed about the center of their antenna,
thereby creating a pencil beam that rotates about the antenna boresight. If the target resides along
the antenna boresight, the return signal will be constant. If the target being tracked does not lie on
the antenna boresight, the return signal will be stronger in the direction of the target offset.
Furthermore, the amplitude of the return signal will fluctuate at the same rate at which the antenna
feed is being nutated, as shown in Figure IV-2.
Figure IV-2: Conscan Radar Return Fluctuating Due to Target Presence
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Target offset can then be determined based on the difference in the relative signal strength of the
fluctuating return signal. The antenna is then repositioned in that direction until the return signal
amplitude becomes relatively constant again.
The aircraft being tracked can also detect the scan modulation of the tracking radar. An
inverse gain jammer might then inject high power pulses 180 degrees out of phase with the skin




Figure IV-3: Conscan Radar Return Plus Inverse Gain Jamming
The result of this jamming would be that the conscan antenna is commanded in the opposite
direction of the target offset. Unfortunately, the jammer power at the victim receiver must be 10-
300 times greater than the signal power (J/S = 10-25 dB) for this technique to be effective
(Schleher, 1986).
5. Cross Eye
Cross eye jamming is an implementation of dual coherent source jamming that enjoys good
effectiveness against monopulse radars. This deception technique employs dual, separate, repeater
paths to generate a "null" at the victim receiver in the direction of the jammer. Each repeater path
retransmits a received signal from the position at which the other has received it. The repeater path
lengths must be electrically identical to maintain the proper phase relationship. Additionally, one of
the paths must contain a phase shifter to ensure that the two retransmissions add destructively at the
victim receiver to create a null. If this null is strong enough, it will cover up the skin return of the
aircraft. Figure IV-4 shows a typical cross eye relationship.
33
'. figure IV-4: Cross Eye Repeater Jamming Implementation
The effectiveness of this technique is limited by the spacing between the receiving antenna
and the transmitting antenna, which is called the baseline. Current implementations involve
wingtip installations and are baseline limited by the overall aircraft wingspan. Towed decoy
implementations would present a much greater potential baseline, at the expense of limited
effectiveness on the nose and tail. Unfortunately, the jammer power at the victim receiver must be
approximately 100 times greater than the signal power (J/S = 20 dB) for this technique to be
effective (Schleher, 1986). Furthermore, the actual jammer power required varies with the
baseline length.
6. Cross Polarization
Cross polarization jamming is a deception technique that is effective against some
monopulse radars. Monopulse radars use multiple lobes simultaneously to determine the angular
position of a target by comparing the signal strength between lobes. When a parabolic reflector is
used in the implementation, the antenna naturally radiates a small portion of the power orthogonal
to the primary polarization. This polarization skewing is accounted for when processing the
received echo. The cross polarization jammer determines the polarization of the incoming signal,
and retransmits a signal whose polarization is orthogonal to the incoming signal. If the jammer
power density at the radar antenna is at least 100 times greater than the signal power density (to
account for the polarization mismatch which attenuates 99% of the jammer power density), the
jammer power will be of the same order as the signal power at the antenna terminals. This
additional power will induce an azimuth or elevation error in the monopulse radar in the same
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manner that inverse gain affects conscan radars. This causes the monopulse radar to make a
correction in a wrong direction, thereby walking the radar beam away from the aircraft. As stated
earlier, the jammer power must be at least 100 times greater than the signal power (J/S > 20 dB)
for this technique to be effective (Schleher, 1986).
B. JAMMING SUMMARY
Table IV- 1 summarizes the representative jamming techniques presented above, the
associated (J/S)
reqd for each, and the intended victim radar types.
Table IV-1: Radar Jamming Techniques (after Schleher, 1986)
Jamming Technique (J/s)
req (J/S)req (dB) Victim Radar Type
Noise 1-4 0-6 Pulse
RGPO 1-4 0-6 Pulse, Pulse Doppler
VGPO 1-4 0-6 CW, Pulse Doppler
Inverse Gain 10-300 10-25 Conscan, Angle Tracking, Lobing
Cross Eye 100 20 Monopulse
Cross Polarization 100-10,000 20-40 Monopulse
Modern self-protection jammers are capable of as many as several thousand watts JERP
and utilize many techniques. The AN/ULQ-21 (V) Countermeasures Set is a modern, digital
system used to simulate EA threats for testing and training requirements. Many of the techniques
discussed above can be generated by the ULQ-21, as well as more current techniques. A partial
list of ULQ-2 1 techniques is included as table IV-2.
A limitation of pure noise jamming, however, is susceptibility to track-on-jam/home-on-
jam (TOJ/HOJ) systems. Thus, the ULQ-21 (and other modern jammers) uses coherent, smart
noise jamming techniques. Furthermore, jamming is much more effective when several techniques
are combined, particularly when range denial (noise jamming) and azimuth deception (cross
polarization, etc.) are combined.
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Table IV-2: Representative ULQ-21 Techniques
Jamming Technique












SURVIVABILITY ENHANCEMENT DUE TO COMBINED SIGNATURE
REDUCTION AND ELECTRONIC ATTACK
A. SIGNATURE REDUCTION AND ELECTRONIC ATTACK COMBINED
The effect of combining signature reduction and electronic warfare capabilities is
synergistic - the combined effect is greater than the sum of their individual contributions. A
reduction in RCS enhancesjamming because it reduces the skin return with which thejamming
must compete. Analysis of this synergy starts with an understanding of a representative jamming








: Radar Path with Jamming
The jammer power adds to the noise power and return echo signal power at the receiver. Detection
is accomplished if the signal power exceeds (S/N)det after being processed in the receiver. In the
presence ofjamming, this becomes the signal-to-interference (S/I) ratio, where interference is a








A representative range of values for these variables are presented in table V-l. Note that
numerically, (S/I) is essentially equal to (S/J), and that S/I is relatively insensitive to S/N
variations.











Development of an equation which physically relates the ratio of the signal strength to the
interference is more complex, and follows the developments in Chapter m. The "echo" signal










The signal-to-interference ratio is then given by eq. (V-2), where interference consists ofjamming
plus thermal noise, and system losses are accounted for with an L in the denominator.
;
s/)=(s/n + ,) =
2^2.RG^cr
v3n 4(47c)
JR L(N + J)
(V-2)
Focusing initially on noise jamming, the receiver noise power, eq. (HI-8), and the noise jammer





















In this form, eq. (V-3) applies to noise jamming against a single pulse. Multiplying the
signal power (numerator) by the integration improvement factor, eq. (III-l 1), to account for the
























where the "N" suffix indicates applicability to noise jamming only.
An order of magnitude analysis of both the noise power at the receiver, eq. (EQ-6), and the
jammer power at the receiver, eq. (IV-2), was conducted. The analysis was based on the air-to-air
scenario and a self protection jammer with an ERP of 1 Watt. The comparison revealed that both
power levels were similar orders of magnitude at approximately 30 nm. At close range, however,
the jammer power rapidly exceeded the noise power.
Eq. (V-4N) can be adapted to deception techniques by applying the.integration
improvement factor to the jammer power in the denominator as well as the signal power in the
numerator, eliminating the bandwidth ratio, and adding the loss factor L to the denominator. In
this manner, everything except the noise benefits from pulse integration, as seen in eq. (V-4D),
S/\ = PtG?A?a
(4tt)












where the "D" suffix indicates applicability to deception techniques only.
Analysis of eqs. (V-4N) and (V-4D) reveals five main sets of variables: R, JERP (PjGp,
S/I, o, and the radar unique parameters. The mission threat analyses serve to fix the radar unique
parameters, leaving four remaining variables. In order to more fully understand these
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relationships, it is useful to solve eqs. (V-4N) and (V-4D) in terms of each of the other three main
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Solving for R is much more troublesome. Rewriting eqs. (V-4N and (V-4D) in the form of
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These equations were coded in MATLAB and EXCEL to generate plots of the inter-
relationships between these four major variables for a specific radar. A representative EXCEL
program, entitled RCS-JERP, is included as an appendix. For copies of this program, please
contact Dr. Robert Ball, or the author. A summary of representative values for all variables, as
well as plots of JERP versus RCS for four different data combinations are presented in the Table
and Figures that follow.



















co (deg/sec) 80 120
Tl 0.7 NA































































Figure V-2: Air-to-Air Scenario with Noise Jamming (Range = 35km)

















































h.± i i... ..l



































































Figure V-5: Strike Scenario with Deception Jamming (Range = 1 1km)
Figures V-2 through V-5 provide a means for determining the combinations of RCS and
JERP design specifications that meet the requirements of the mission threat analysis in terms of
detection range, based upon the threat radar systems selected. It should be pointed out that the
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results presented here are unique to the unclassified characterization of the two threat radar systems
presented earlier. The J/S requirements will flow from a study of which techniques are determined
to be effective against these threat radar systems. Once the appropriate technique is determined, the
applicable figure (mission and jamming type dependent) can be entered using the required J/S
associated with that technique. Presumably, the input will be an initial RCS level for which the
resulting output is the JERP that will prevent targeting by the specified threat system until the
required range for the desired technique. Further iteration of the RCS design specification and the
associated JERP level will result in a set of specifications that will meet the requirements of the
specific mission threat analysis. For EA implementations which utilize combinations of noise and
deception, the worst case (in terms of JERP) should be used. It is anticipated that multiple mission
threat analyses will need to be performed to find the most restrictive set of design specifications
that meet the requirements of the analyses.
As an example of this methodology, assume the achievable RCS level is 1 .0 square meters.




d of 4 and 0.2 watts for a (J/S)req . d of 100.
B. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND DATA PRESENTATION
1. Addition of Cost Data
The above plots demonstrate a nearly linear relationship when plotted in a log-log format.
The curves do, however, depart linearity at low RCS and low jammer power levels as the noise
power level and the jammer power level reach similar orders of magnitude. It can be safely
assumed that the cost curves associated with achieving the range of RCS levels considered in this
report are not linear. A similar assumption can also be made regarding the jammer power levels.
Therefore, incorporation of classified cost data on the above plots will likely yield a three
dimensional surface with valleys indicating areas of more "efficient", cost effective design
requirements. The classification level of this report prevents exploring this option.
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2. Evaluating Different Deception Techniques
The above figures are also useful in evaluating the implementation of different deception
techniques. If a more effective technique is available at the expense of a much higher J/S required,
it can easily be determined how much more JERP is required to implement it or how much the
signature must be reduced to accommodate it, or what combinations of both will result in success.
For example, if noisejamming with a required J/S of 4 is effective, but cross eye deception with a
required J/S of 100 is better, one can easily determine how much additional JERP is required to
support the cross eyejamming implementation and determine its feasibility.
3. Different Data Presentations
The data can be presented in many more ways to approach the design specification problem
from different perspectives. Figure V-6 is a good way to explore the sensitivity of the design to
S/N and J/S variations. S/I is calculated using eq. (V-l), based on the S/N for the threat radar
system and the J/S of the applicable jamming technique. This value then forms the basis of a trade
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Another way to present the data is Figure V-7, which is a plot of detection range versus the























































A JERP = 10
• JERP = 1 00
10
Figure V-7 : Detection Range versus RCS for Slotback Radar Scenario with Noise Jamming
(S/I = 0.25, from Table V-l))
Figure V-7 demonstrates the sensitivity of the detection range to very low powerjamming
at constant S/I. This figure is useful when the J/S of the desired technique is not subject to
variation, which yields a constant S/I. A constant S/I would be the case if the EA effectiveness
analysis determined that the threat radar could only be victimized by a single, uniquejamming
technique. However, assuming a constant S/I limits its utility in evaluating different deception
techniques with varying J/S requirements as this would cause a corresponding change in S/I. The
figures provide an easy means of trading range requirements against JERP and RCS, for a constant
S/I, if the range requirement of the mission threat analysis is negotiable.
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In summary, the first step in the JSF trade study between EA power and RCS level is a
mission threat analysis for threats that the JSF is expected to encounter during representative
missions. The mission threat analysis defines both the applicable threat radar system and the
tactical advantage (in terms of detection range) which must be provided for the JSF to get the first
shot off in an engagement. Once the threat system has been characterized and the pertinent radar
parameters defined, potentially effective jamming techniques are considered and the required J/S
ratios determined. Finally, an EXCEL spreadsheet is used to generate charts depicting acceptable
combinations of JERP and RCS for comparison.
Using the methodology presented in this report, and the EXCEL spread sheet, the effects
on survivability of combined RCS reduction and EA power can be evaluated. Further JSF mission
threat analyses will undoubtedly be conducted involving additional threat systems. The EXCEL
program used to develop the charts in Chapter V can easily be modified to incorporate data for
other threat systems. The user must provide the pertinent threat radar and jammer characterization
data in the upper portion of the spreadsheet. Calculations will be performed automatically in
accordance with the annotated equations. Some scaling of the plots may be necessary.
It is recommended that numerous mission threat analyses be conducted on ALL threats the
JSF could potentially encounter, as well as realistic estimates of future threats. These analyses
should be conducted using all weapons in the U.S. arsenal that will be available to the JSF,
including long range standoff weapons. From these analyses, the most stringent conditions can be
determined.
In the past, analyses of susceptibility reduction features such as signature reduction and
onboard EA may have focused on either RCS or JERP alone, ignoring whatever influence the
other may have on the outcome. However, signature reduction and onboard EA are not mutually
exclusive techniques, but should be applied synergistically. While a strong case can be made for
limiting emissions on very stealthy designs, the same is not necesarily true for moderately low
RCS designs. For moderately low RCS levels, detection is not always denied, but either targeting
is denied (rail keeping) or the missile is deceived (very large miss distance) by the employment of
onboard EA. Signature reduction and jammer capability must be evaluated for the combined effect
they have on achieving mission success. Only by evaluating all capabilities in concert with one
another can a cost efficient design solution be reached.
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It should also be clear that this type of trade-off analysis MUST be performed in the early
design stages of the aircraft. The inclusion of cost data in the design optimization will help
determine that combination of RCS level and JERP that meets the tactical requirements at the


































'I vs RCS I = 21.71




RCS 10 5 2 1 0.5 0.2 0.1
S/N Dry 23.5 11.8 4.7 2.4 1.2 0.5 0.2
S/l (1) JERP=1 1.956 0.978 0.391 0.196 0.098 0.039 0.020
S/l (10) JERP =10 0.196 0.098 0.039 0.020 0.010 0.004 0.002
S/l(100) JERP =100 0.020 0.010 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000




i S/l = 0.01 0.01
S/l = 0.10 0.10
S/l = 0.25 0.25
RCS 10 5 2 1 0.5 0.2 0.1
S/l = 0.01 196.344 98.1699 39.2656 19.6309 9.81353 3.9231 1.95963
S/l = 0.10 19.6309 9.81353 3.9231 1.95963 0.97789 0.38885 0.1925






R (1) JERP = 1
R (100) JERP = 100







J(1) 7.5E-05 S/l = 0.25
J(100) 0.00748
J(200) 0.01496
10 5 2 1 0.5 0.2 0.1
248.739 209.164 166.342 139.876 117.621 93.5408 78.6581
102.203 72.7817 46.2338 32.741 23.1687 14.6598 10.3676
10.3692 7.33211 4.63724 3.27902 2.31862 1.46642 1.03692
7.33211 5.18459 3.27902 2.31862 1.63951 1.03692 0.73321
6.2E+10 4.4E+10 2.8E+10 2E+10 1.4E+10 8.7E+09 6.2E+09
1E+10 5.3E+09 2.1E+09 1.1E+09 5.4E+08 2.1E+08 1.1E+08
1.1E+08 5.4E+07 2.2E+07 1.1E+07 5375992 2150397 1075199
5.4E+07 2.7E+07 1.1E+07 5375992 2687996 1075199 537599
9259.72 4629.86 1851.94 925.972 462.986 185.194 92.5972
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